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INTRODUCTION
• Jurors typically rely on eyewitness confidence as an
indicator of accuracy and fail to consider the role of a
wide range of relevant system variables (e.g., lineup
construction) and estimator variables (e.g., witnessing
conditions; see Cutler et al., 1988).
• Legal safeguards designed to facilitate juror
evaluations of eyewitness evidence usually result in
general skepticism rather than sensitivity to variations
in evidence quality (Van Wallendael et al., 2007).
• Counterfactual thinking—imagining how things might
have been—has been shown to lay evaluations of
eyewitness evidence (Rodriguez & Berry, 2016).
• We tested whether embedding a legally-relevant
adaptation of counterfactual mindset induction within a
trial (namely, defense closing arguments) would
sensitize jurors to variations in eyewitness evidence
quality and inform their verdicts.

METHOD
Design: 2 (Witnessing/Identification Conditions [WIC]:
Good vs. Bad) × 2 (Mindset: Causal vs. CFT)
Participants
• N = 323 jury-eligible undergrads participated online
• 70% female, Mage = 19 years (SD = 1.5)
Trial Stimulus
• Participants read an abbreviated transcript of a
murder trial, based on Wilford et al. (2018).
• The main form of evidence against the defendant was
an eyewitness, who underwent direct and crossexamination. Jurors also read about inconclusive
physical evidence.
• We manipulated several factors to create 2 different
WIC (lighting, viewing distance, perpetrator race,
administrator blindness, pre-lineup instructions, number
and similarity of fillers, clothing bias, administrator
steering, post-identification feedback, pre-trial publicity).
Dependent Variables
• Memory accuracy ratings
• Dichotomous verdicts

DISCUSSION

RESULTS
Memory Accuracy Ratings
• A 2 (WIC) × 2 (Mindset) ANOVA did not reveal the predicted interaction, F (1, 319) =
.029, p = .865. There was a significant main effect of WIC, F (1, 319) = 15.835, p <.001.
Participants rated the witness’s memory as weaker in the Bad WIC condition compared
to the Good WIC condition (see Figure 1).
Figure 1: Memory Accuracy Ratings

Figure 2: Percentage of Convictions
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Verdicts
• Logistic regression with a backward elimination procedure did not reveal a significant
WIC × Mindset interaction, b = .328, Wald χ2 (1, N = 323) = .724, p = .395. However,
there was a significant main effect of WIC, b = -0.630, Wald χ2 (1, N = 323) = 5.969, p =
.015 Participants returned fewer guilty verdicts in the good WIC condition than the bad
WIC condition (see Figure 2).
• Memory accuracy ratings predicted verdicts when added to the model, b = .21, z =
12.94, p < .001, and the main effect of WIC was reduced to nonsignificance, suggesting
mediation. The indirect effect of WIC on verdict via memory accuracy ratings was
statistically significant, b = .06, z = 3.82, p < .001.

• We did not replicate the findings of Rodriguez and Berry
(2016): A counterfactual mindset did not sensitize jurors
to WIC.
•One possible reason we didn’t observe the predicted
effect is because overall the evidence against the
defendant was relatively weak as evidenced by the
overall conviction rates in Figure 2. Although the pattern
of convictions in the counterfactual condition
corresponded to our predictions, a floor effect may have
restricted our ability too observe a significant interaction.
•Another possibility is that a counterfactual mindset
manipulation imbedded within defense attorneys’ closing
arguments is not effective. Perhaps the mindset
induction may be more fruitfully embedded in other
legally relevant procedures (e.g. judicial instruction).
•Although previous studies show that jurors have a hard
time evaluating eyewitness evidence, our data indicated
that jurors naturally distinguished good from bad WIC’s
and their conviction rates changed accordingly.
•Future research should examine the possibility of a
sensitization effect using stimulus materials that avoid the
potential influence of statistical artifacts.
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